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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
    GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
AVOIDABLE TRANSFERS. Within the 90 days prior
to the debtor's filing for bankruptcy, the debtor made several
payments to a creditor who supplied the debtor with cheese
products. Most of the cheese delivered remained unpaid at
the filing for bankruptcy. The trustee argued that the
payments were preferential transfers to the extent the
payments exceeded the amount still owed to the creditor,
because the new value defense of Section 547(c)(4) was
applicable only to the extent the goods remained unpaid for.
The court found that the value of the cheese shipped after
each payment exceeded the amount of each payment;
therefore, the court held that under Section 547(c)(4), the
transfers were not preferential because the creditor supplied
new value for each payment. In re IRFM, Inc., 52 F.3d 228
(9th Cir. 1995), aff'g unrep. D. Ct. dec. aff'g, 144 B.R. 886
(Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1992).
DISCHARGE. The debtors had obtained several loans
over several years from the FmHA (now CFSA) and had
filed financial statements listing items of farm equipment
and livestock as collateral. The debtors’ Chapter 7
bankruptcy schedules, however, did not list any of these
assets. The debtors did not present any records to show what
happened to the assets and the debtors admitted that the
financial statements were inaccurate. The court held that the
debts were nondischargeable and denied the debtors'
discharge for failure to provide accurate and complete
records of their business operations and assets. In re
Hartman, 181 B.R. 410 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1995).
The debtor owned and operated several farm
corporations with the debtor's brother. The brothers had
obtained several loans from the SBA and FmHA (now
CFSA) and had defaulted on the loans before filing for
bankruptcy. The Bankruptcy Court had held that the SBA
and FmHA claims were nondischargeable because the
brothers had obtained the loans by fraud, had disposed of
collateral without consent and without remitting the
proceeds to the creditors, and had misrepresented the true
interrelationship of the corporations to the SBA and FmHA.
The District Court took additional testimony from the debtor
and reversed the Bankruptcy Court decision as to the debtor
because the court found that the debtor did not have control
of the farm operations. The appellate court reversed, holding
that the Bankruptcy Court had sufficient evidence of the
debtor’s involvement in the management of the farming
operations to make the debtor responsible for the fraud. In
re Foust, 52 F.3d 766 (8th Cir. 1995).
    CHAPTER 12   -ALM § 13.03[8].*
AUTOMATIC STAY. A creditor sought relief from the
automatic stay or at least adequate protection payments
during the case. The debtors' farm and timber land, farm
equipment and livestock were found to have a value in
excess of the creditor's secured claims.  The court found the
equity cushion to be between 12 and 20 percent and noted
that other courts have been divided as to the need for
adequate protection payments where the equity cushion was
within that range. The court held that because the debtor had
some time yet to propose a plan, the adequate protection
payments would not be required but that the creditor could
reapply for adequate protection payments if a workable plan
was not proposed by the required date.  In re Glenn, 181
B.R. 105 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. 1995).
The debtor had filed a previous Chapter 12 case which
was dismissed for cause because the debtor failed to provide
any evidence of sufficient finances to operate a hog facility
to produce enough income to fund the plan. Four days after
the dismissal, the debtor filed the instant Chapter 12 case,
with the only change as a possible loan from another lender.
The court held that relief from the automatic stay would be
granted the secured creditor because the debtor did not have
sufficient change of circumstances to change the reasons for
the first dismissal since the new loan would not change the
amount of debt owned by the debtor. Matter of Kennedy,
181 B.R. 418 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1995).
DISMISSAL . The debtors had originally filed in
Chapter 12 but moved to dismiss the case after relief from
the automatic stay was granted to a creditor. The creditors
objected and moved to have the case converted to Chapter 7
because of fraud committed by the debtors during the
bankruptcy case. The court held that once the court has
determined that the case should be converted because of
fraud committed by the debtors, the debtors no longer have a
right to have the case dismissed under Section 1208(b)
because the case is no longer under Chapter 12.  The court’s
reasoning was that the debtor's motion can be held under
advisement by the court while it holds hearings on the fraud
charges. Once the fraud has been established, the case can
be converted to Chapter 7. Once the case has been
converted, the court can again bring up the debtors' motion
and deny it since the case is no longer in Chapter 12. This
procedural maneuvering to side-step the clear language of
Section 1208(b) seems less straightforward than the
approach taken by In re Graven, 936 F.2d 378 (8th Cir.
1991) where the court looked to legislative history to find
authority to grant conversion for fraud when the debtor has
requested dismissal. In re Neal, 181 B.R. 560 (D. Utah
1995).
ELIGIBILITY. The debtors owned and operated a cow
and calf operation on land which also included timber land.
The debtors also purchased standing timber from other land
owners and sold the standing timber to lumber companies
who harvested the timber. The debtors managed the forests
between the time of purchase and the time of resale. The
court held that the timber business was a farming operation
because the debtors did manage the timber lands before sale;
therefore, the debtors' income from the timber sales was
included in their gross income from farming and made them
eligible for Chapter 12. The court focused on the debtors'
risk from fire or other hazards during the time they owned
and managed the trees. In re Glenn, 181 B.R. 105 (Bankr.
E.D. Okla. 1995).
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TRUSTEE FEES. The debtor's plan provided for annual
payments on a secured claim. Although not in accordance
with the plan, the debtor sold all cattle at once and submitted
the proceeds to the secured creditor in complete payment of
the claim. The trustee did not know about the sale until the
debtor placed the excess proceeds in an escrow account for
disbursement as required by the court. The trustee applied to
the court for payment of the escrow proceeds to the trustee
in payment of the trustee's fee on the proceeds paid to the
creditor. The court held that the trustee was entitled to the
fee on the payment of the cattle proceeds to the creditor. The
court followed In re Fulkrod, 126 B.R. 584 (Bankr. 9th Cir.
1991) in holding that all plan payments were subject to the
trustee's fee, whether paid directly to the creditor or
disbursed through the trustee. In re C.A. Jackson Ranch
Co., 181 B.R. 552 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. 1995). See also Harl,
“Paying Creditors Directly in Chapter 12 Bankruptcy,” 6
Agric. Law Dig. 73 (1995).
   FEDERAL TAXATION    -ALM § 13.03[7].*
ALLOCATION OF TAX PAYMENTS. The debtor
had owed unpaid employment taxes and agreed to sell the
debtor's dentistry practice in order to pay these taxes. The
debtor had worked closely with an IRS agent and had
obtained a delay of a levy while the debtor sought the sale of
the practice. When the practice was sold, the debtor remitted
the proceeds equal to the taxes owed but the IRS allocated
the payment to the debtor's income tax deficiency instead of
the employment tax deficiency. The court held that the IRS
was required, under these circumstances, to allocate the
payment to the employment taxes. In re Jones, 181 B.R.
538 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1995).
DISCHARGE. The issue in this case was whether the
debtor had signed tax returns prepared by the IRS for 1981
and 1982 so as to make the taxes dischargeable. Neither the
debtor nor the IRS presented any evidence of a substitute
return. The court held that summary judgment on the issue
could not be granted because an issue of fact remained as to
whether the debtor did sign any return prepared by the IRS.
Matter of Gless, 181 B.R. 414 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1993).
In 1987, more than three years before the debtors filed
for Chapter 7, the IRS conducted an audit of their 1982
through 1986 tax years. The debtors cooperated with the IRS
and signed a Form 4549, Income Tax Examination Changes,
prepared by the IRS. The issue was whether the Form 4549
functioned as a return for those years for purposes of the
dischargeability of the taxes under Section 523(a)(1)(B).
The court held that the Form 4549 functioned as a return and
allowed the discharge of the taxes. Matter of Berard, 181
B.R. 653 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1995).
ESTATE PROPERTY. The debtor had owed unpaid
employment taxes and agreed to sell the debtor's dentistry
practice in order to pay these taxes. As part of the sales
agreement, the debtor received an amount equal to the
employment taxes owed plus an amount stated as for an
agreement to to compete with the buyer. However, the
debtor admitted that this amount was actually for goodwill
and existing customer base. The debtor argued that the
payments were not subject to the pre-petition IRS liens
because the payments arose postpetition so long as the
debtor did not compete with the buyer. The court held that
the payments were included in the gross estate because the
payments were in exchange for the debtor's pre-petition
property.  In re Jones, 181 B.R. 538 (Bankr. D. Kan.
1995).
EMPLOYER LIABILITY
FELLOW SERVANT DOCTRINE . The plaintiff was
an officer in a farm corporation and was injured while
working with another officer for the corporation. The
plaintiff was standing in the back of a truck loaded with
hogs and the other officer was driving the truck. The
plaintiff alleged that the driver negligently operated the
truck to cause the plaintiff to fall and be injured. The
corporation argued that the fellow servant doctrine
prohibited the suit. The plaintiff argued that the plaintiff and
officer were not working together sufficiently to invoke the
fellow servant doctrine. The court held that summary
judgment for the defendant was not proper because a fact
issue remained as to whether the two workers were
cooperating in a particular task at the time of the injury.
Heepke v. Heepke Farms, Inc., 649 N.E.2d 958 (Ill. Ct.
App. 1995).
FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
COTTON. The CCC has adopted as final determinations
that the 1995 Upland Cotton acreage reduction is zero and
that no paid land diversion program will be implemented for
the 1995 crop. 60 Fed. Reg. 31623 (June 16, 1995).
CROP INSURANCE. The CCC has adopted as final
regulations which require producers to obtain at least the
catastrophic level of crop insurance for each crop of
economic importance in order to be eligible for any price
support, production adjustment benefit, or payments under
any CRP contract. 60 Fed. Reg. 32899 (June 26, 1995).
DAIRY TERMINATION PROGRAM. The plaintiff
was a dairy farmer who enrolled in the Dairy Termination
Program (DTP).  The ASCS ruled that the plaintiff had
violated the DTP contract in that two cows were not
destroyed and were still being milked by a former employee
of the plaintiff on another farm.  Although the plaintiff
pursued the ruling through DASCO and presented
substantial evidence to refute the statements of the former
employee as to how the cows escaped slaughter, the plaintiff
was not allowed to cross-examine the former employee.
The court first held that the DASCO decision was not
reviewable de novo because the instant case was a review of
an administrative decision and not a contract case.  The
court also held that the administrative appellate procedure
was governed by the ASCS appeal regulations, 7 C.F.R. Part
780, and not the Administrative Procedures Act.  However,
the court held that the ASCS abused its discretion under Part
780 in not allowing cross-examination of the former
employee, given the substantial contradictory evidence and
the ASCS’s strong reliance on the former employee's
statements in finding that the plaintiff had violated the DTP
contract. In addition, in its remand order, the court required
DASCO to make specific findings as to the knowledge of
the plaintiff as to the removal of the cows by the former
employee, because if the plaintiff did not know about the
removal, the plaintiff could not be held in violation of the
contract. DASCO failed to conduct a remand hearing within
the allotted time and the plaintiff sought judgment on all
issues in the plaintiff’s favor. The court held that the
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plaintiff was entitled to judgment removing all penalties
resulting from the adverse DASCO rulings. Because the
plaintiff’s right to contract payments required either an
ASCS affirmative ruling of compliance with all contract
provisions or a waiver of violations based on good faith
compliance, the case was remanded to DASCO for such
determinations; however, the court prohibited use of the
former employee’s testimony as support for any DASCO
ruling. On remand, DASCO again ruled, based on the
record, that the plaintiff had not slaughtered all cattle and
had acted in bad faith. DASCO also held that the plaintiff
had not kept sufficient records, although that issue had not
been raised in the first hearing. The Court of Federal Claims
upheld the decision on the grounds of no jurisdiction to
review the final determination of DASCO. The appellate
court reversed, holding that the courts have authority to
review DASCO decisions for abuse of authority, including
violations of procedural requirements and court orders. The
court held that DASCO had violated the first Court of
Federal Claims ruling by continuing to consider evidence
which DASCO was ordered to exclude. The court held that,
without the testimony of the former employee, the only
proper ruling was that the plaintiff had complied with the
DTP requirements and the court ordered that the plaintiff
receive all DTP payments without penalty.  Doty v. U.S., 53
F.3d 1244 (Fed. Cir. 1995), rev’g unrep. Fed. Cls. dec.
See also Doty v. U.S., 27 Fed. Cl. 598 (1993); Doty v. U.S.,
24 Cls. Ct. 615 (1991).
FEDERAL ESTATE AND
GIFT TAX
FLOWER BONDS. The decedent’s estate included
“flower bonds” which the executor used to pay federal estate
taxes based on the par value of the bonds plus accrued
interest. The executor argued that the value of the bonds
should have been increased to account for additional interest
accrued during the nine month grace period available to
estates in paying federal estate tax. The court held that only
the value of the bonds as of the date of death can be used
and that any subsequent effects on bond value cannot be
included in the date of death value. Weld v. Comm’r, 95-1
U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,198 (Fed. Cir. 1995), aff'g, 31
Fed. Cls. 81 (1994).
GENERATION SKIPPING TRANSFERS-ALM §
5.04[6].*  The decedent and spouse had created an inter
vivos revocable trust in 1968. The trust provided that upon
the death of one of the trustors, the trust was to be split into
two trusts to minimize the estate taxes by creating a marital
trust with sufficient assets to reduce the estate tax to zero.
The remainder of the trust after the death of both trustors
passed to the trustor’s children and grandchildren. The trust
was amended in 1981 to create three trusts to add a credit
shelter trust. The trust was amended a third time in 1983 but
the attorney drawing up the amendment did not know about
the second amendment; thus, the third amendment created
ambiguities in the trust agreement. After the death of the
decedent, the ambiguities were discovered and the estate
petitioned the local court to restate the trust to remove the
ambiguities. The IRS ruled that the restatement of the trust
agreement did not subject the trusts to GSTT. Ltr. Rul.
9523025, March 13, 1995.
GIFT-ALM § 6.01.*  At the death of the decedent, the
decedent’s estate passed to two trusts, a marital trust and a
family trust. The surviving spouse was the income
beneficiary of both trusts and the couple’s children were the
remainder beneficiaries. The marital trust was funded with
various parcels of real property, personal property and
shares of stock in a wholly-owned family corporation in
which two of the children were officers. The family trust
was funded with most of the rest of the stock. A dispute
arose between the children and surviving spouse about the
conduct of the corporation’s business and the non-officer
children and the surviving spouse did not want to share the
risk of the corporation. Thus, a settlement was reached
which provided that (1) the marital trust would purchase half
of the family trust stock; (2) the marital trust was split into
two trusts, one funded only with stock and the other funded
only with nonstock property; (3) the family trust was split
into two trusts, one owning stock and one owning other
assets; and (4) the surviving spouse remained income
beneficiary of all four trusts but the officer children were the
only remainder beneficiaries of the trusts holding the stock
and the other children were the only remainder beneficiaries
of the nonstock trusts. The IRS ruled that because all
beneficiaries consented to the change, no gain or loss was
recognized by the transactions. The IRS also ruled that the
transfers resulted from the financial and business concerns
of the parties; therefore, the transfers were made in the
ordinary course of business. Because the transfers were
made in the ordinary course of business, the transfers were
deemed to have been made for adequate and full
consideration and would not be considered a taxable gift
under Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-8. Ltr. Rul. 9523029, March
15, 1995.
POWER OF APPOINTMENT. The decedent was a
co-trustee and beneficiary of a trust established by the
decedent's predeceased parent. The trust provided that the
trustees could distribute corpus to the decedent for the
decedent's "care and comfort." In 1977, the decedent became
the sole trustee for a short time before a second trustee was
named. The IRS argued that the decedent had a general
power of appointment over the trust during the time the
decedent was sole trustee and that the appointment of a
second trustee was a release of that power. The court held
that the decedent had a power of appointment subject to an
ascertainable standard of care and comfort; therefore, the
trust corpus was not included in the decedent's gross estate.
Estate of Strauss v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1995-248.
TRANSFERS WITH RETAINED INTERESTS-ALM
§ 5.02[3].* A year before death, the decedent transferred
$350,000 to an investment fund which also received
$547,666 from three trusts in which the decedent was a
beneficiary. The decedent received a lifetime income
interest in the investment fund. The decedent received only
$6,000 from the fund before death. The estate did not
include the $350,000 in the decedent's gross estate. The IRS
argued that the $350,000 was included in the gross estate
because (1) the decedent had not received adequate
consideration for the transfer and (2) the income interest
received by the decedent was not capable of valuation
because of the uncertainty of the amount of the three trusts
which would have been otherwise paid to the decedent. The
IRS cited Gradow v. U.S., 11 Ct. Cls. 808 (1987), aff'd, 897
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F.2d 516 (1987) to support its argument that the decedent
received a life estate in the value of the principal of the three
trusts contributed to the fund, which was valued at
$257,671. Because the life estate received was less than the
amount contributed, $350,000, the adequate consideration
exception of I.R.C. § 2036(a) did not apply. Although the
court expressed some reservations about the Gradow
holding, the court agreed with the IRS valuation because the
estate failed to demonstrate why Gradow did not apply to
this case. The IRS also argued that, because the decedent
had a right to income and possibly corpus from the trusts,
the amount of the trusts' contribution was not measurable
because the decedent had a right to receive some of that
property even before the transfer to the investment fund. The
court agreed with the IRS, holding that because the decedent
already had a right to most, if not all, of the trusts' property,
the decedent potentially received nothing from the transfer
of the trusts to the investment fund.   Parker v. U.S., 95-1
U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,199 (N.D. Ga. 1995).
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
BAD DEBTS The taxpayer had given money to the
taxpayer's daughter for capitalization of a skating rink
business. The checks had notations that the funds were
loans. The court held that the loans were bona fide because
the taxpayer intended to be repaid. The court also held that
the bad debts were claimed in the correct taxable year
because the taxpayer knew that the business had lost its
assets to the landlord and the daughter was unable to pay the
business debts. Bowman v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1995-
259.
COURT AWARDS AND SETTLEMENTS-ALM §
4.02[14].* The taxpayer had filed suit against third parties
for malicious prosecution. The jury award for the taxpayer
included punitive damages which the taxpayer excluded
from gross income. The taxpayer argued that under Texas
case law, punitive damages had an element of compensation
of the plaintiff. The court held that under Texas law,
punitive damages were noncompensatory; therefore, the
punitive damage award was included in gross income.
Estate of Moore v. Comm'r, 53 F.3d 712 (5th Cir. 1995),
aff'g, T.C. Memo. 1994-4.
The taxpayer was an airline pilot who filed an action
against a former employer under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA) for back pay and liquidated
damages. The court held that the award received by the
taxpayer in the action was included in the taxpayer's gross
income because the award was either punitive damages or
for back pay, neither of which was an award for personal
injuries or sickness. Commissioner v. Schleier, 95-1 U.S.
Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,309 (S. Ct. 1995).
The taxpayer, an airline pilot, brought a suit against an
airline under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act for
wrongful termination of employment. The parties reached a
settlement which included back pay and liquidated damages.
Under 1977 law, the court held that the back pay and
liquidated damages were excludible from the taxpayer’s
income. The Supreme Court remanded the case for
consideration in light of the holding in Schleier, supra.
Schmitz v. Comm’r, 95-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,322
(S. Ct. 1995), rem’g, 34 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1994).
INSURANCE PROCEEDS. The taxpayer was a lumber
company which had suffered the loss of its mill and
inventory in a fire. The taxpayer received the proceeds of a
fire insurance policy which exceeded the basis of the
property destroyed. The taxpayer excluded most of the
proceeds from income based on claimed expenses for clean-
up costs and inventory replacement. The court held that the
amount of insurance proceeds in excess of the taxpayer's
basis was taxable income and held that the clean-up
expenses could not be offset against the proceeds because
the taxpayer failed to substantiate those expenses. Gorman
v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1995-268.
INTEREST RATE.  The IRS has announced that for the
period July 1, 1995 through September 30, 1995, the interest
rate paid on tax overpayments is 8 percent and for
underpayments is 9 percent. The interest rate for
underpayments by large corporations is 11 percent. Note:
the just-enacted GATT legislation reduces the interest rate
on overpayments above $10,000 by 1.5 percentage points.
Rev. Rul. 95-46, I.R.B 1995-26.
JOINT RETURNS. The taxpayer was the wife of a man
who owned a corporation which operated an electrical
business. The taxpayer did not participate in the business
and was not an officer or shareholder in the business. The
couple had been married for several years and the man
prepared all the couple's joint tax returns. For the tax year in
question, the husband had secretly sold all the stock in the
corporation and had included the gain on the tax return. The
husband forged the taxpayer's signature on the return and
left town. The court held that the taxpayer was not liable for
the taxes on the return because the taxpayer never intended
to sign the return, the taxpayer did not know about the
transaction which gave rise to the tax liability and the
taxpayer did not benefit from the transaction. In re Kaiser,
181 B.R. 395 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1995).
LIKE-KIND EXCHANGES. The taxpayer owned an
undivided interest in a parcel of land with several other
persons. All owners agreed to an exchange of interests so
that each co-owner would receive a complete fee interest in
a portion of the land equal to the value of the original
undivided interest in the whole parcel. The exchange was
made through a qualified intermediary who received title to
the property and then simultaneously reconveyed title to
each portion to each person. The taxpayer held the property
for investment before and after the exchange and all
property was of like-kind. The IRS ruled that the exchange
qualified for nonrecognition of gain. The IRS cautioned that
if any of the other owners were related to the taxpayer,
I.R.C. § 1031(f) could cause recognition of gain from the
exchange if the property is sold by the taxpayer or the
related party within two years after the exchange. Ltr. Rul.
9522006, Feb. 15, 1995.
PENSION PLANS. For plans beginning in June 1995,
the weighted average is 7.27 percent with the permissible
range of 6.54 to 7.92 percent (90 to 109 percent permissable
range) and 6.54 to 7.99 percent (90 to 110  percent
permissable range) for purposes of determining the full
funding limitation under I.R.C. § 412(c)(7).  Notice 95-37,
I.R.B. 1995-25, 6.
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S CORPORATIONS-ALM § 7.02[3][c].*
PASSIVE INVESTMENT INCOME. The taxpayer was
an S corporation which leased commercial real estate. The
corporation employed a building manager and employees to
provide services to the tenants, including hiring of
maintenance personnel for the building, finding tenants,
negotiating leases, mediating of tenant disputes, and
approving of alteration of the premises by the tenants. The
corporation paid the utility costs, taxes and insurance for the
buildings. The IRS ruled that the rental income from the
properties was not passive investment income to the
corporation. Ltr. Rul. 9523015, March 10, 1995.
The taxpayer was a corporation which rented
commercial real estate to another corporation which had the
same shareholders as the taxpayer. The lease was not a net
lease. The taxpayer provided services for the tenant,
including general building maintenance, general equipment
maintenance, employees for the tenant’s tool room,
landscaping services, snow and ice removal around the
building, and cafeteria services for the tenant’s employees.
The IRS ruled that the rental income from the property was
not passive investment income to the taxpayer. Ltr. Rul.
9523016, March 10, 1995.
SAFE HARBOR INTEREST RATES
July 1995
Annual Semi-annual Quarterly Monthly
Short-term
AFR 5.97 5.88 5.84 5.81
110% AFR 6.57 6.47 6.42 6.38
120% AFR 7.18 7.06 7.00 6.96
Mid-term
AFR 6.28 6.18 6.13 6.10
110% AFR 6.92 6.80 6.74 6.71
120% AFR 7.56 8.42 7.35 7.31
Long-term
AFR 6.76 6.65 6.60 6.56
110% AFR 7.45 7.32 7.25 7.21
120% AFR 8.14 7.98 7.90 7.85
SALE OF RESIDENCE. The taxpayer resided in a
building used by the taxpayer's partnership for business
purposes. The partnership claimed depreciation and business
expenses for the operation and maintenance of the entire
property and the taxpayer did not pay rent to the partnership
for use of a portion of the property as a residence. When the
partnership dissolved, the taxpayer sold the building and
purchased another residence. The Tax Court held that the
taxpayer could not rollover any part of the gain on the sale
of the building under I.R.C. § 1034 as a sale of a residence.
The decision was affirmed in a case designated as not for
publication. Walshe v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1994-46,
aff'd, 95-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,301 (2d Cir. 1995).
THEFT LOSSES The taxpayer had invested in stock in
a corporation. When the stock price went down, the taxpayer
claimed a theft loss for the loss in value, arguing that a
corporate officer had made misrepresentations which
induced the taxpayer to buy the stock. The court held that no
theft loss deduction was allowed because no theft under
state law had occurred, since no one had appropriated any of
the taxpayer's property. Marr v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo.
1995-250.
PRODUCTS LIABILITY
CATTLE FEED. The plaintiffs were partners in a
family partnership which operated a dairy farm. The
plaintiffs purchased cattle feed from the defendants who
were the sellers and manufacturers of the feed. The plaintiffs
alleged that the feed was contaminated and resulted in the
death of cows, loss of breeding ability of cows, injuries to
the cows, loss of milk production, and caused the cows to
fall, resulting in injury to two of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs
filed claims for products liability under Or. Rev. Stat. §
30.920; breach of implied warranty of fitness for a particular
purpose; breach of implied warranty of merchantability;
negligence per se for violation of Or. Rev. Stat. § 633.045;
negligence in the manufacture, inspection and testing of the
feed; and fraudulent misrepresentation. The plaintiffs sought
economic damages, non-economic damages for the personal
injuries and punitive damages. The defendants argued that
the plaintiffs' claim for loss of goodwill and business
reputation were not allowed because the partnership was not
a party to the action. The court held that damages for
goodwill and business reputation were not allowed in breach
of contract actions. The defendants argued that no action
arose under Or. Rev. Stat. § 30.920 because the feed was not
unreasonably dangerous since it caused only economic
losses. The court held that, because the plaintiffs alleged that
the feed caused injury to the plaintiffs' cows, the claim was
sufficient under the statute. The defendants argued that
punitive damages were not allowed in a products liability
action. The court held that because the plaintiffs alleged that
the defendants knowingly sold the contaminated feed
without telling the plaintiffs, the punitive damages could be
awarded. The defendant argued that Or. Rev. Stat. § 30.920
did not provide a private right of action. The court held that
a violation of the statute did not give rise to a private cause
of action but could be used as a standard of negligence to
support the plaintiffs' claim. The defendants also sought to
exclude the damages for the personal injuries suffered by the
plaintiffs from falling cows as not foreseeable. The court
held that this issue was not sufficiently developed in the
record for determination.  Carpenter v. Land O'Lakes,
Inc., 880 F. Supp. 758 (D. Or. 1995).
SECURED TRANSACTIONS
DRAGNET CLAUSE. The debtors operated a ranch
and farm in Arizona with a wholly-owned corporation. The
debtors and their corporation had obtained loans from a
creditor and the security agreements contained dragnet
clauses which made the collateral subject to all indebtedness
of the debtors to the creditor. The debtors also borrowed
funds from the creditor for a cotton gin operation run by
another corporation and a partnership. The court held that
the dragnet clauses in the first security agreements did not
reach the cotton gin assets because the two sets of loans
were not related and the creditor did not rely on the dragnet
clauses in granting the cotton gin loan. In re Auza, 181 B.R.
63 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1995).
FEDERAL FARM PRODUCTS RULE. The GIPSA
has announced that the certification of the Oklahoma central
filing system now includes sesame crops. 60 Fed. Reg.
32651 (June 23, 1995).
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DEBTOR’S RIGHTS IN COLLATERAL. The
debtor had contracted with a third party to produce
sunflower seeds. The third party had agreed to provide
financing for the raising and harvesting of the crop plus a
portion of the profits from the crop. The third party did not
file any security interest with the state central filing system.
The debtor leased land from related business entities which
also did not record their interests in the debtor’s crops. The
debtor sought a loan from the plaintiff bank but did not
disclose the third party’s interest in the crop nor the leases.
The plaintiff searched the central filing system records and
local records and found no record of any other interests in
the crops. After the loan was made and the bank perfected a
security interest in the crops, the other interests were
discovered and the bank sought a declaratory judgment that
its security interest held priority. The third party argued that
the debtor did not have title to the crops because the crop
contract reserved title in the third party; therefore, the
debtor did not have sufficient interest in the crops for a
security interest to attach. The court held that mere lack of
title was not sufficient to prevent attachment of a security
interest and that the debtor’s control over the land and the
production of the crop was sufficient interest in the crop for
the security interest to attach. Because the bank was the
first party to perfect its security interest, the bank’s security
interest had priority. First Nat’l Bank v. Pleasant Hollow
Farm, 532 N.W.2d 60 (S.D. 1995).
CITATION UPDATES
Est. of Carpenter v. Comm’r, 52 F.3d 1266 (4th Cir.
1995), aff'g, T.C. Memo. 1994-108 (marital deduction) see
p. 92 supra.
AGRICULTURAL LAW MANUAL
by Neil E. Harl
This comprehensive, annotated looseleaf manual is an
ideal deskbook for attorneys, tax consultants, lenders and
other professionals who advise agricultural clients. The
book contains over 900 pages and an index.
As a special offer to Digest subscribers, the Manual is
offered to new subscribers at $115, including at no extra
charge updates published within five months after
purchase. Updates are published every four months to keep
the Manual current with the latest developments. After the
first free update, additional updates will be billed at $100
per year or $35 each.
For your copy, send a check for $115 (WI residents add
$5.75 sales tax) to Agricultural Law Press, P.O. Box 5444,
Madison, WI 53705.
Satisfaction guaranteed. 30 day return privilege.
ISSUE INDEX
Bankruptcy
General
Avoidable transfers 107
Discharge 107
Chapter 12
Automatic stay 107
Dismissal 107
Eligibility 107
Trustee fee 108
Federal taxation
Allocation of tax payments 108
Discharge 108
Estate property 108
Employer liability
Fellow servant doctrine 108
Federal Agricultural Programs
Cotton 108
Crop insurance 108
Dairy termination program 108
Federal Estate and Gift Tax
Flower bonds 109
Generation skipping transfers 109
Gift 109
Power of appointment 109
Transfers with retained interests
109
Federal Income Taxation
Bad debts 110
Court awards and settlements 110
Insurance proceeds 110
Interest rate 110
Joint returns 110
Like-kind exchanges 110
Pension plans 110
S corporations
Passive investment income 111
Safe harbor interest rates
July 1995  111
 Sale of residence 111
Theft losses 111
Products Liability
Cattle feed 111
Secured Transactions
Dragnet clause 111
Federal farm products rule 111
Debtor’s rights in collateral 112
